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RESEARCH PARTICIPATION:
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RAYMOND LOVE, PHLA1m.D.****
INTRODUCTION
For well over a year, the Maryland Attorney General's Working
Group on Conducting Research on the Cognitively Impaired has been
considering the involvement of persons unable to give their own con-
sent to participate in biomedical and behavioral research.' The
group's goal has been to develop proposed legislation to clarify the
ethically and legally acceptable conditions under which such persons
may, or may not, be involved in human subjects experimentation.2 If
the legislation proposed by the Working Group is passed, it will estab-
lish the state of Maryland, and the thoughtful, open and deliberative
process created by the Maryland Attorney General's Office, as a model
of how public policy in health care ought to be developed.
The Working Group's starting point is the adult who has become
unable to provide his or her own consent for research participation
prior to study entry as a result of insufficient decision-making capac-
ity.' In this paper the authors use the term decisionally impaired for
* The ideas and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author's only and
do not represent any position or policy of any federal agency, or any other institution or
organization to which they are affiliated.
** Senior staff fellow in the Department of Clinical Bioethics at the National Institutes
of Health. Her present research interests focus on ethical issues involving cognitively and
psychiatrically impaired persons in research, as well as ethical issues in oncology and
genetics.
*** Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, University of Maryland, School of Medicine. Dr.
Conley is also the Director of the Treatment Research Program at the Maryland Psychiatric
Research Center.
**** Associate Professor and Vice Chair of Pharmacy Practice and Science, University of
Maryland, School of Pharmacy.
1. SeeJack Schwartz, Office of Md. Att'y Gen., Second Report of the Maryland Attor-
ney General's Working Group (May 1998) (the Second Report is reprinted in the Appen-
dix to this issue of the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy) [hereinafter Second Report].
2. See id. at 1.
3. See id. at 2.
ASSESSMENT OF CAPACITY
this category of person.4 Beginning with the decisiOnally impaired
adult is consistent with the majority of philosophic, public policy, and
empirical research literature addressing the ethics of involving deci-
sionally impaired persons in biomedical and social science research.5
The prospect of finally developing useful, appropriate, and spe-
cific protections for medical and social science research involving
decisionally impaired persons seems to be a realistic possibility. That
is because discussions about the ethics of involving decisionally im-
paired persons in research have been going on for many years and
have become increasingly sophisticated and focused.6 Now that this
4. For a more complete discussion of why this terminology is used and who is in-
cluded by this term, see Evan G. DeRenzo, Decisionally Impaired Persons In Research: Refining
the Proposed Refinements, 25J. L. MED. & ETHICS 139 (1997).
5. See generally Jessica Wilen Berg, Legal and Ethical Complexities of Consent with Cogni-
tively Impaired Research Subjects: Proposed Guidelines, 24J. L. MED. & ETHICS 18 (1994); Rich-
ard J. Bonnie, Research with Cognitively Impaired Subjects, 54 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 105
(1997); William T. Carpenter et al., The Rationale and Ethics of Medication-Free Research in
Schizophrenia, 54.ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 401 (1997); S.J. Delano &J.L. Zucker, Protecting
Mental Health Research Subjects Without Prohibiting Progress, 45 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIA-
TRY 601 (1994); Evan Gaines DeRenzo, The Ethics of Involving Psychiatrically Impaired Persons
in Research, IRB, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 7; Evan Gaines DeRenzo, The Ethics Of Involving Severely
Cognitively Impaired Persons in Research: The Continuing Debate, 3 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE
ETHICS 539 (1994); Rebecca Dresser, Mentally Disabled Research Subjects: The Enduring Policy
Issues, 276 JAMA 67 (1996); Carl Elliot, Caring About Risks, 54 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 113
(1997); Joseph J. Fins & Franklin G. Miller, The Call of the Sirens: Navigating the Ethics of
Medication-Free Research in Schizophrenia, 415 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 113 (1997); K.W.M.
Fulford & K. Howse, Ethics of Research with Psychiatric Patients: Principles, Problems and the
Primary Responsibilities of Researchers, 19J. MED. ETHICS 85 (1993); Kathleen Cranley Glass &
Marc Speyer-Ofenberg, Incompetent Persons as Research Subjects and the Ethics of Minimal Risk,
5 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 362 (1996); Fritz A. Henn, A European Perspective, 54
ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 412 (1997); Dallas M. High et al., Guidelines for Addressing Ethical
and Legal Issues in Alzheimer Disease Research: A Position Paper, 8 ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE & ASSO-
CIATED DISORDERS 66 (1994); Edward W. Keyserlingk et al., Proposed Guidelines for the Partici-
pation of Persons with Dementia as Research Subjects, 38 PERSPECTIVES BIOLOGY & MEo. 319
(1995); Greg A. Sachs, Advance Consent for Dementia Research, 8 ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE & Asso-
CIATED DISORDERS 19 (1994); Greg A. Sachs et al., Ethical Aspects of Dementia Research: In-
formed Consent and Proxy Consent, 42 J. CLINICAL RES. 403 (1994).
6. See generally THE NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEP'T OF HEALTH EDUC. AND WELFARE, PUB. No.
(OS) 78-0006, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH INVOLVING THOSE INSTrtTrION.-
ALIZED AS MENTALLY INFIRM (1978); JAY KATZ & ALEXANDER MORGAN CAPRON, CATA-
STROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES WHAT? (1975); H. Helmchen, Problems of Informed Consent
to Clinical Trials in Psychiatry, 1 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 435 (1981); Ruth Macklin,
Some Problems in Gaining Informwed Consent from Psychiatric Patients, 31 EMORY L.J. 345 (1982);
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH. MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: VOL. 1: REPORT 168 (U.S.
Gov't Printing Office: 1982); Barbara Stanley, Senile Dementia and Informed Consent, I
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 57 (1983); James F. Drane, The Many Faces of Competency: The Greater the
Risk, The Stricter the Standard HAS'TINGS CENTER REPORT, April 1985, at 17; Virginia R. Cas-
sidy & Lorys F. Oddi, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Informed Consent: A Nursing Research Perspec-
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possibility is coming closer to realization, discussions have begun shift-
ing to the prior issue of assessment of capacity to give research
consent.
7
As attention is directed towards the process of assessing capacity
to provide ethically and legally valid consent to research participation,
three important facets of this issue emerge. First, appreciation for the
primitive nature of our ability to assess decisional capacity is growing.8
Second, old debates around who ought to be performing, or be in-
volved in, capacity assessment have been revived.9 Third, the need to
develop more refined and standardized assessment tools as adjuncts
to clinical judgment has become more pressing.' °
This paper addresses these three points. More specifically, it will
give a selective review of the relevant historical antecedents that have
influenced progress to date, discuss the ethical tensions inherent in
considerations of assessment of capacity to give research consent,
present the on-going work of our group in this area and the related
work of others, and set a path for future research and debate that is
necessary to advance the ethical standards of the conduct of biomedi-
cal and behavioral research with decisionally impaired persons.
How We Have Come to Where We Are Today: Convergence of
Historical Factors
A patient or subject's capacity to make decisions has been an im-
portant consideration from the earliest discussions of the doctrine of
tive, J. PROF. NURSING, Nov.-Dec. 1986 at 343; Vijaya L. Melnick et al., Clinical Research in
Senile Dementia of the Alzheimer's Type Suggested Guidelines Addressing the Ethical and Legal
Issues, in ALZHEIMER'S DEMENTIA: DILEMMAS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH 295 (Viaya L. Melnick &
Nancy Dubler eds., 1985); ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS:
THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING (1989); American College of Physicians, Cog-
nitively Impaired Subjects: Position Paper, 111 ANN. INTERN. MED. 843 (1989); Greg A. Sachs &
Christine K. Cassel, Biomedical Research Involving Older Human Subjects, 8 LAw, MEDICINE &
HEALTH CARE 234 (1990); D. Becker, Informed Consent in Demented Patients: A Question of
Hours, 12 LAw & MED. 271 (1993); Ruth Macklin, Philosophical Conceptions of Rationality and
Psychiatric Notions of Competency, 57 SYNTHESE 205 (1983); A. Donald Milliken, The Need for
Research and Ethical Safeguards in Special Populations, 38 CANADIAN J. PSYCH IATRY 681 (1993).
7. See infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
8. See generally BECKY COX WHITE, COMPETENCE TO CONSENT (1994); Paul S. Appel-
baum, Rethinking the Conduct of Psychiatric Research, 54 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 117 (1997);
Testimony of Paul S. Appelbaum before the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
(NBAC)Transcripts 2/2 at 2-7 (July 15, 1997) (transcripts on file with Evan DeRenzo)
[Hereinafter NBAC testimony of Paul S. Appelbaum].
9. See NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 13; DeRenzo, supra note 4, at 19-20; Bonnie, supra
note 5, at 107-109.
10. See generally NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBIECTS OF BI-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 6.
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informed consent." Interestingly, as important as capacity is, its as-
sessment has not been a focus of much empirical attention. Rather,
the literature, particularly the early literature on empirical studies of
informed consent, clusters around studies looking at information ex-
change and understanding of information disclosed. 2 Many of these
studies are poorly designed resulting in equivocal findings.
As the data have evolved, however, the majority of studies con-
clude that seriously ill research subjects have difficulties in many facets
of providing ethically valid consent." This has also been the finding
in a majority of the few studies specifically investigating capacity to
provide consent. t4 Only one well-designed series of studies has con-
cluded that seriously ill subjects are able to give ethically valid in-
formed consent to research.'5
The Stanley et al. studies compared psychiatrically and somati-
cally ill subjects in a setting where they were asked to consider con-
senting to hypothetical research projects." As the psychiatric
subjects' consent behavior was not statistically different from that of
the somatic subjects, and because their patterns of consent and refusal
were comparable to those of the somatically ill subjects, the investiga-
tors concluded that the psychiatrically ill subjects were providing valid
informed consent.1 7
II. See generally JAY KATz, EXPERIMENTATION wiTH HUMAN BEINGS (1972); KATz &
CAPRON, supra note 6; A. Meisel et al., Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of Informed Consent,
134 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 285 (1977); Thomas S. Szasz & Marc H. Hollender, The Basic Models
of the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 97 ARCHVES INTERNAL MED. 585 (1956).
12. See generally CHARLES W. LIDZ ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAK-
ING IN PSYCHIATRY, CHAPTER 3 (1984); Alan Meisel & Loren H. Roth, Toward An Informed
Discussion of Informed Consent: A Review and Critique of the Empirical Studies. 25 ARIz. L. Rv.
265 (1983); Alan Meisel & Loren H. Roth, What We Do and Do Not Know About Informed
Consent, 246JAMA 2473 (1981); Laurence Tancredi, Competency for Informed Consent: Concep-
tual Limits of Empirical Data, 5 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 51 (1982).
13. See, e.g., LIDZ ET AL., supra note 12; ADviSORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERI-
MENTS: FINAL REPORT (1995); Monica H. Schaeffer et al., The Impact of Disease Severity on the
Informed Consent Process in Clinical Research, 100 AM. J. MED. 261 (1996).
14. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Empirical Assessment of Competency to Consent to
Psychiatric Hospitalization, 138 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 1170 (1981); Caroline L. Kaufman & Loren
H. Roth, Psychiatric Evaluation of Patient Decision-Making: Informed Consent to ECT, 16 Soc.
PSYCHIATRY 11 (1981); Debbie Schachter et al., The Effect of Psychopathology on the Ability of
Schizophrenic Patients to Give Informed Consent 1821. MENT. Dis. NERV. 360 (1994); Barbara
Stanley et al., The Functional Competency of Elderly at Risk, 28 GERONrOLOGIST 53 (1988).
15. See generally Barbara Stanley et al., Informed Consent and Competency in Psychiatric Re-
search, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 669 (1981); Barbara Stanley & Michael Stanley, Psychiatric
Patients' Comprehension of Consent Information, 23 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 375 (1987).
16. See generally id
17. See Stanley et al., supra note 15, at 671; see also Stanley & Stanley, supra note 15, at
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The foundational assumption was that somatically ill persons pro-
vide ethically and legally valid consent.'" Other work questions this
assumption.' The counter interpretation is that many research sub-
jects have impaired decisional capacity, whether somatically or psychi-
atrically ill.2" This interpretation has been well supported. In an
influential and often cited study of fifty-two female subjects involved
in a labor-induction study, twenty (39%) were found to be unaware
that they were research subjects, although all had signed consent doc-
uments." Further, of those who knew they were part of a study, there
were frequent misunderstandings of essential aspects of study
participation.22
These findings have been supported by more recent investiga-
tions. In a study of cardiac and cancer research subjects undertaken
by the President's Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experi-
ments, confusion about study participation was widespread.23 Some
study subjects did not know they were in research although they had
signed consent documents. 24 Others, who were not part of a research
protocol, thought they were. 25
In another investigation, which was designed to assess the efficacy
of the informed consent process in subjects with a range of disease
severity, 26 the study showed that as disease severity increases the ability
of subjects to retain information from the consent process de-
creases.2 7 In short, the sicker the patient-subject, the less able the in-
dividual was to remember essential information central to his or her
research participation.
18. See Stanley et al., supra note 15, at 669; see aLso Stanley & Stanley, supra note 15, at
375.
19. See Stanley et al., supra note 15, at 670-71 (Results indicated that the level of psycho-
pathology may not be a good index of patient's ability to consent to participation, these
results contradict frequent assumptions that the more severely disturbed the patient is, the
less able he or she is to evaluate research risks.); see also Stanley & Stanley, supra note 15, at
375. In a study that examined psychiatric and medical patients' willingness to participate
in a series of hypothetical studies, no differences were found between the two patient
groups. See id. at 375-76. Both psychiatric and medical patients agreed to participate in the
studies in a manner which was consistent with the level of risk attendant to the study proto-
col. See id. at 376.
20. See id.
21. See BRADFORD H. GRAY, HUMAN SUBJECTS IN MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION 96 (1975);
Bradford H. Gray, Complexities of Informed onsent, 437 ANNALS AM. AAD. POL. & SoC. SCI.
37, 43 (1978).
22. See Gray, supra note 21, at 103.
23. ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 13, at 737.
24. See id. at 736-37.
25. See id.
26. See Schaeffer, supra note 13, at 261.
27. See id. at 264.
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The largest and most important body of empirical studies of in-
formed consent to research has produced replicable data demonstrat-
ing serious impairments on the part of subjects to provide ethically
and legally valid consent. 28 Because this corpus has been produced by
psychiatric researchers, it has concentrated on decisional capacity in
psychiatric research subjects. In a landmark investigation, Lidz et al.
demonstrated systematic and pervasive confusions on the part of sub-
jects and investigators about the differences between research and
clinical care.29 Subjects confused research goals with an intent to be
treated. 0 Moreover, investigators confused these distinctions, as
well. 3 1
In laying the groundwork for this seminal study,3 2 the investiga-
tors shaped the five requirements of the doctrine of informed consent
(information, understanding, competency, voluntariness and the deci-
sion, itself) into the following questions:
1. Information: What was disclosed, how, when, and by
whom?3
3
2. Understanding: What did the patient understand about
the treatment?3
4
3. Competency: If the patient did not understand, did he
or she have the cognitive capacity to do so?
35
4. Voluntariness: Was the patient free to choose? Was he
or she subject to coercion or undue influence?3 6
5. Decision: What was the overall structure of the way in
which decisions about treatment were made? What role
did the formal disclosure play?37
None of these questions haye yet been fully answered. They have,
however, garnered increasing attention, including question two and
its derivatives, such as: If the subject signed a consent form, was the
person sufficiently capacitated to do so? and How do we assess capac-
ity to give initial and on-going consent to research participation in a
questionably capacitated individual?38 Although there is much re-
28. See supra note 14.
29. See LIDZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 28.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 26.
32. See generally id.
33. See id. at 24-25.
34. See id. at 25-28.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 28-30.
37. See id. at 28. •
38. See generally Applebaum et al., supra note 14; Kaufman & Roth, supra note 14;
Schachter et al., supra note 14; Stanley et al., supra note 14.
1998]
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search and ethical analysis yet to be done, the ground breaking work
begun in this study and continued by this group have been invaluable
to advancing knowledge and discussion of these complex research
and research ethics issues.
One contribution stands out among the many. That is, this
group has consistently found a specific kind of confusion on the part
of patients about the purpose of their research participation.39 This
phenomenon has been consistently replicated and is now widely ac-
knowledged.4" Since publication of their earliest studies, Lidz et al.
have reproduced this finding with such consistency that they have
given this confusion the name "therapeutic misconception."4 The
therapeutic misconception is the notion that research subjects view
their study participation as really being for their clinical benefit.4"
This notion is now generally accepted and is part of the common vo-
cabulary of scientists and ethicists involved in this research domain.
43
The notion of the therapeutic misconception is now being taken
seriously in large part because the work of this psychiatric research
group has reached a critical mass, sufficient to cause a shift in beliefs
and scientific notions.44 In fact, it is not an overstatement to suggest
that the respect engendered by this group's work and its sheer vol-
ume, coupled with a grudging acceptance of the veracity of their no-
tion of the "therapeutic misconception," have brought us to a point at
which serious clinical, empirical, and public policy attention is now
being paid to assessment of capacity to consent to medical treatment
39. See generally id.
40. See generally Michael Bamberg & Nancy Budwig, Therapeutic Misconceptions: When the
Voices of Caring and Research Are Misconstrued as the Voice of Curing, 2 ETHICS & BEHAV. 165
(1992); NBAC testimony of Paul S. Appelbaum, supra note 8.
41. Paul S. Appelbaum et al., False Hope and Best Data: Consent to Research and the Thera-
peutic Misconception, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, April 1987, at 20; see generally Paul S. Appel-
baum et al., The Therapeutic Misconception: Informed Consent in Psychiatric Research, 5 INT'LJ.L.
& PSYCHIATRY 319 (1982); Loren H. Roth et al., Informed Consent in Psychiatric Research, 39
RUTGERS L. REv. 425, 436 (1987); Loren H. Roth & Paul S. Appelbaum, Obtaining Informed
Consent for Research with Psychiatric Patients: The Controversy Continues, 6 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS
N. AM. 551 (1983).
42. Paul S. Appelbaum et al., The Therapeutic Misconception: Informed Consent in Psychiatric
Research, supra note 41, at 320.
43. See generally supra note 41; Paul R. Benson et al., Information Disclosure, Subject Under-
standing, and Informed Consent in Psychiatric Research, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 455 (1988);
Paul R. Benson et al., Informed Consent in Psychiatric Research: Preliminary Findings From an
Ongoing Investigation, 20 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1331 (1985); Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appel-
baum, Mentally Ill and Non-Mentally-IU Patients' Abilities to Understand Informed Consent Disclo-
sures for Medication: Preliminary Data, 15 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 377 (1991).
44. See generally THoMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvOLUTIONS (1970).
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and research.45 But an accumulation of sound data seems not to be
the only reason there is a growing urgency to attention of the ethics
and study of assessment of capacity to provide research consent.
In addition to the evolution of scholarly attention to consent is-
sues in research involving decisionally impaired persons, historically
relevant socio-political influences have contributed importantly to
bringing us to where we are today. These include a general shift away
from acceptance of authority to a cultural norm of skepticism. The
counter-culture movement of the 1960's that sprung up in opposition
to the Vietnam War ushered in an era of heightened questioning and
doubt. Contemporaneous to this rise in generalized skepticism were
revelations of abuse in medical research by American physician-inves-
tigators outside46 and inside47 the Federal government, increasing
mistrust of authority, in general, and the medical profession and med-
ical research community more specifically.48
Part and parcel of this change in cultural levels of trust and re-
spect for authority have been the increased appreciation for cultural
diversity.49 With an acceptance of diversity has come increased polit-
ical and consumer power of various subpopulations in the culture,
such as the Black Power and Women's movements.50 Acceptance of
multiculturalism has led to an awareness that the existing medical
power structure does not necessarily represent the multicultural na-
ture of the nation's population.5 Therefore, it is now readily ac-
knowledged that there often are value differences between doctor and
patient that may influence medical decision-making.
With an appreciation for the divergence of values between doctor
and patient, and general deconstruction of old notions of objectivity
45. WHITE, supra note 8, at xi - xiv; see also, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso,
The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. 1, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 105 (1995); Thomas
Grisso et al., The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. II, 19 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 127
(1995); Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study.
III., 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (1995); see also NBAC testimony of Paul S. Appelbaum,
supra note 8.
46. See generally Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1354 (1966) (giving examples of questionably ethical practices in medical schools and uni-
versity hospitals).
47. See generally JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILS ExPERIMENT
(1993).
48. See generally DAVIDJ. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAw
AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (1991).
49. See e.g., HARLEY E. FLACK & EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO, AFRICAN-AMERICAN PERSPEC-
TIVES ON BIOMEDICAL ETHICS at v (1992).
50. See id.
51. See id. at vii.
52. See id, at ix.
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in science, a sea change in locus of control of medical decision-mak-
ing has taken place. Much that was previously understood to be based
on objective scientific fact is now recognized as subjectively deter-
mined or influenced.5" That is, today there is a growing recognition
that physician recommendations are not simply grounded in medical
fact, but filtered through the physician's subjective interpretation of
medical, as well as psycho-social data.54 Relatedly, recognition of this
subjectivity has illuminated unacceptable power differentials in the
doctor-patient relationship resulting in further change in traditional
models of doctor-patient interaction."
Finally, the specter of abuse of vulnerable subjects has resurfaced
glaringly over the last several years. Charges of abuse resulting from
problems in schizophrenia research,56 and revelations about radiation
experiments conducted by the United States government 57 have re-
kindled memories of local5" and foreign59 atrocities committed on
vulnerable research subjects, many of whom were mentally retarded,
psychiatrically ill and/or minors.' Rapid advances in genetics have
also triggered horrible memories. These remembered images pro-
duce revulsion in the public, further eroding trust and respect for the
research community.6
In summary, there is renewed attention to incidences of abuse of
decisionally-impaired research subjects; there has been a change from
assuming objectivity to assuming subjectivity in medical decision-mak-
ing; there is a growing body of literature that demonstrates poor qual-
ity of understanding and retention by research subjects of the
53. See Mark R. Tonelli, SubstitutedJudgment in Medical Practice: Evidentiary Standards on a
Sliding Scale, 25J. L. MED. & ETHIcs 22, 23 (1997). But seeJoshua S. Golden & George D.
Johnston, Problems of Distortion in Doctor-Patient Communications, I PSYCHIATRY MED. 127, 129-
31 (1970) (analyzing the results of a study investigating patients' understanding of what
physicians tell them).
54. See generalyJOSHUA S. GOLDEN & GEORGE D. JOHNSTON, Problems of Distortion in Doc-
tor-Patient Communications in PSYCHIATRY IN MEDICINE, 127-49 (1970).
55. See generally HOWARD BRODY, THE HEALER'S POWER (1992); JAY KATz, THE SILENT
WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984); ROTHMAN, supra note 48; David Mintz, What's in a
Word: The Distancing Function of Language in Medicine, 13J. MED. HUMAN. 223 (1992).
56. See OFFICE FOR PROTECTION FROM RESEARCH RISKS DIVISION OF HUMAN SUBJECT PRO-
TECTIONS, EVALUATION OF HUMAN SUBJECT PROTECTIONS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA.RESEARCH CON-
DUCTED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los ANGELES (1994).
57. See generally ADviSORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, Supra note 13.
58. See generally JONES, supra note 47.
59. See generally GEORGEJ. ANNAS & MICHAEL A. GRODIN, THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE
NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION (1992).
60. See generally id.
61. See, e.g., EDWIN R. DUBOSE, THE ILLUSION OF TRUST: TOWARD A MEDICAL THEOLOGI-
CAL ETHICS IN THE POSTMODERN AGE 1-3 (1995).
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informed consent process; and there is consistent evidence of confu-
sion on the part of researchers and subjects about distinctions be-
tween research and clinical care. Given that these factors exist in a
broad social context of increasing diversity and consumer power, it is
little wonder that the forces that defeated efforts to increase protec-
tions for decisionally-impaired research subjects in 198262 are being
overtaken in 1998.63 But, rather than rush to change the research
system prematurely, ethical analysis must continue while empirical
studies progress in refining methods of ascertaining which research
subjects need which kinds of enhanced protections.
Capacity to Give Consent to Research: Reinterpreting the Ethical Arguments
Just as empirical investigation of assessment of capacity to give
consent to research participation is in its infancy, so too is scholarly
analysis of the ethics of assessment. Like the majority of empirical
studies, the majority of scholarly ethical analyses address the concern
of what protections ought to be in place when involving persons al-
ready lacking capacity. Only very recently has there been explicit eth-
ics discussion of the need for more research into how best to assess
capacity. 64
While much of the recent ethics literature about decisionally-im-
paired persons in research has called for increasing protections,
65
concerns about discrimination have served as one of the two counter-
vailing arguments for many years.66 The discrimination argument
holds that if special protections are placed on research participation
of decisionally-impaired persons, such protections will disproportion-
ately single out psychiatric research subjects and exacerbate the stig-
matization they already experience.67
Applying a principlist analysis, the discrimination argument has
been vigorously and well argued on grounds that it upholds the basic
62. See Bonnie, supra note 5, at 107-108.
63. See T.D. v New York Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996) (striking down the state health regulations as providing inadequate procedural safe-
guards for decisionally impaired patients), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997),
leave to appeal granted by 684 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997), and appeal dismissed by 1997 WL 785461
(N.Y. Dec. 22, 1997).
64. See WHeTE, supra note 8, at xi; see aLso DeRenzo, The Ethics of Involving Psychiatrically
Impaired Persons in Research, supra note 5, at 3; NBAC testimony of Paul S. Appelbaum, supra
note 8, at 118.
65. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 5; Delano & Zucker, supra note 5; DeRenzo, supra note 4;
High et al., supra note 5; Keyserlingk, et al., supra note 5.
66. See Bonnie, supra note 5, at 108.
67. See id.
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ethical principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice a.6  Not
exacerbating existing stigmatization of psychiatrically ill persons
avoids further harming this group and in so doing, advances the good.
Not singling out psychiatrically ill research subjects upholds the prin-
ciple of justice by assuring that these subjects are not treated differ-
ently from others, where similar treatment is interpreted as equity and
fairness. Given that the Belmont Reporf is built on a principlist frame-
work, applying a principlist argument against added protections for
research participation of decisionally-impaired persons has been
persuasive.
Although this argument has held up for many years, there are
now newer ethical analysis strategies that may better account for the
many facets of the argument. Casuistry,7" clinical pragmatism,"1 and
feminist ethics approaches7" have been added to the ways in which
ethical problems in medical research can be analyzed since the Na-
tional Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedi-
cal and Behavioral Research wrote the Belmont Report.7  Where
decisionally impaired persons are involved in research, and especially
where assessment of capacity is an issue, a feminist ethics analysis, 74
added to a principlist approach, 5 addresses more fully the underlying
considerations that influence this area of research.
From a feminist perspective, framing avoidance of discrimi-
nation of psychiatrically ill persons as a way to uphold the
principle of nonmaleficience also avoids explicit discussion
of clinically and morally relevant facts about psychiatric dis-
ease. It is simply a matter of clinical reality related to disease
68. See ToM L. BEAuCHAMP &JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 418
(1994).
69. THE NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979).
70. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 68, at 92-97.
71. See generally Joseph J. Fins et al., Clinical Pragmatism: A Method for Moral Problem Solv-
ing, 7 KENNEDY INST. ETHICSJ. 129 (1997).
72. See generally Evan Gaines DeRenzo & Michelle Strauss, A New Model of Clinical Ethics
Case Consultation: Adding a Feminist Ethics Filter, 9 HEC FORUM 3, 212-27 (1997).
73. NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 69.
74. See generally S.L. BARTKY, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenol-
ogy of Oppression (1990); S. HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986); HELEN
B. HOLMES & LAURA M. PURDY, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS (1992); ROSE-
MARIE TONG, FEMINISM AND FEMINIST ETHICS (1993); Maggie 0. Little, Why a Feminist Ap-
proach to Bioethics? 6 KENNEDY INST. ETHICSJ. 1 (1996).
75. See Dresser, supra note 5, at 67-68.
[VOL. 1:66
ASSESSMENT OF CAPACrIY
process that many persons with psychiatric disease can be ex-
pected to have impaired mental function:
Dealing with subjects whose decision-making capacities
may be impaired (or, in legal terms, who may be incompe-
tent to consent to participate in research) is not an issue
unique to psychiatric research. Investigators recruiting non-
mentally ill geriatric, adolescent, and seriously medically ill
subjects all must be concerned with whether their subjects
have adequate capacities to offer valid consents. But it is dif-
ficult to avoid the conclusion that psychiatric disorders,
which b, definition affect mentation, raise special
concerns.
Decisional impairments are a frequent by-product of many dis-
eases and conditions. In psychiatric conditions, however, (as well as
other diseases and conditions that harm the brain, such as
Alzheimer's disease) the decisional impairment is a central feature of
the diagnosis. This is simply clinical fact related to these specific con-
ditions and resistance to acknowledging it as such is no longer morally
defensible.
Further, what is discriminatory about a psychiatric disease is hav-
ing it. Adding necessary protections so that the sequelae of the dis-
ease do not leave the patient or subject open to harmful manipulation
is a regulatory and moral requirement." These protections, however,
need to be developed in a way that does not further burden persons
who have psychiatric illness, including creating unreasonable barriers
to access to innovative research interventions.
A feminist ethics analysis brings into focus more sharply than a
principlist approach how issues related to power differentials influ-
ence the ethical terrain of the medical research environment. 78 First,
even with the most decisionally intact, strong-willed, research-savvy
subject, there is a power differential between patient-subject and in-
vestigator, regardless of whether the investigator is a physician, nurse,
social worker or social scientist. Invariably, the researcher is on top,
and the patient-subject is on the bottom.
This power differential is a manifestation of the subject being
weakened by disease and the researcher having a superior grasp of the
relevant knowledge base. 79 This power differential is a fact of human
76. NBAC testimony of Paul S. Appelbaum, supra note 8, at 118.
77. See THE NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTEcTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDI-
CAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 69, at 4.
78. See BRODY, supra note 55, at 12 (arguing that notions of "power" need to inform
medical ethical thinking).
79. See id at 15-16.
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psychology within the clinical research setting that needs to be ac-
knowledged, not necessarily as bad, but merely as one of many com-
plexities of the performance of human subjects research that needs to
be considered and addressed adequately to ensure appropriate sub-
ject care and protection. 0
The sicker and more debilitated the subject, the greater the
power differential.8 " This is not a function of nefarious intent. Nor is
it a demonstration that research with sick patient-subjects is inherently
coercive. What is inherently coercive is the disease or condition, it-
self.82 This phenomenon is as true in research as it is in clinical
medicine. Serious disease produces desperation." And while this
desperation - both on the part of subjects .and their families - can
make persons vulnerable to manipulation, there needs to be precision
about the source of the vulnerability. In so doing, defensiveness on
the part of researchers can be reduced, and appropriate and neces-
sary protections can be developed and implemented.
One reason it is crucial that this power differential be acknowl-
edged in a straight forward manner is that such acknowledgment may
work to reduce the psychological discomforts that result from an unar-
ticulated association of the appropriate power of knowledge-holders
with the inappropriate abuse of power. Conflating the two concepts
acts as a disincentive for open and productive conversation between
researchers and research ethicists and fuels the radical elements
within community advocacy groups. This in turn results in truly harm-
ful constraints on necessary and appropriately designed studies.8 4
That power can devolve to abuse of power goes without saying. That
power can be equalized in research is probably a practical impossibil-
ity and may not, in fact, be wise.8 ' But masking the practical realities
prevents us from learning new ways to appropriately manage these
power dynamics and adjust our procedures accordingly.
Attention to power issues can also help to break the impasse re-
lated to concerns about the effect that additional protections might
80. See id. at 12.
81. See id. at 15.
82. See Nancy E. Kass et al., Trust: The Fragile Foundation of Contemporary Biomedical Re-
search, 26 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25, 25-29 (1996).
83. See id. at 25.
84. See T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 186 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted by 684
N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997), and appeal dismissed y 1997 WL 785461 (N.Y. Dec. 22, 1997).
85. See EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S GOOD: THE
RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE 35 (1988).
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have on the physician-investigator/patient-subject relationship. 6
Resistance to considering novel protections for decisionally-impaired
research subjects has often been couched in terms of threats to the
integrity of the doctor-patient relationship.87 But like the weaknesses
in the discrimination argument, resistance to change framed in terms
of threats to the integrity of the doctor-patient relationship is ill
advised.
First of all, the classical construct of the doctor-patient relation-
ship is a function of the clinical world, not the research setting.
Although the advent of managed care in clinical practice has severely
diminished and distorted the integrity of the traditional doctor-pa-
tient relationship, for purposes of the present discussion, let us take
the classical doctor-patient relationship as our image of clinical care.
In clinical medicine, the doctor-patient relationship is understood to
retain its classic form of a one-to-one, private relationship. Such is not
the case in medical research.
The physician-investigator/patient-subject relationship is neither
private nor one-to-one. The physician-investigator, although the per-
son ultimately responsible on the research team, may hardly get to
know the patient-subject. Consent may be obtained by research
nurses, fellows, or non-physician associate investigators. In fact, re-
cruitment may begin well before the patient-subject ever arrives at the
research center or meets anyone on the research team. Finally, the
primary goal of research medicine - advancing knowledge - makes
the relationship between a physician-investigator and a patient-subject
qualitatively different from the classic clinical medicine relationship
between doctor and patient.
Ethical conduct of research demands a straightforward acknowl-
edgment of the differences in the relationship of physician-investiga-
tor to patient-subject and that of doctor to patient. 88
Acknowledgment of these differences, however, ought not be miscon-
strued as pejorative. Again, feminist ethics has important insights to
offer.
Historically, women's moral reasoning has been considered infer-
ior because it is different from men's.8 " The work of Carol Gilligan,
86. See Kathryn M. Taylor & Merrijoy Kelner, Informed Consent: The Physicians'Perspective,
24 Soc. SCI. MED. 135, 140 (1987).
87. See generally Bonnie, supra note 5.
88. See Larry R. Churchill, Physician-Investigator/Patient-Subject: Exploring the Logic and the
Tension, 5J. MED. & PHIL. 215, 220 (1980).
89. See, e.g., Sigmund Freud, Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction be-
tween the Sexes, in THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD (James Strachey
trans. & ed., stand. ed. 1925); LARa KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT
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however, began changing that view to one in which there is an appre-
ciation that, in fact, women do use different moral reasoning
processes than men and that these different processes result in moral
reasoning of equally high quality.9" We should translate this lesson
into the research setting and end the tradition of demeaning the phy-
sician-investigator/patient-subject relationship as less ethically moti-
vated than the doctor-patient relationship. Both are moral
relationships; they simply are different relationships. By appreciating
the moral validity of the physician-investigator/patient-subject rela-
tionship, we free our creative capabilities to more openly address the
complexities inherent in the research setting and develop and imple-
ment appropriate management strategies.
Finally, the feminist ethics acceptance of power as a legitimate
point of ethical inquiry directs us to examine the invisible ways in
which fear of loss of power influences the debates around how best to
protect decisionally-impaired persons in research. "The temptation
for those involved in psychiatric research to see questions about their
practices as troublesome impediments to advancing knowledge ought
to be resisted."" But the temptation to resist what may be felt as a
threatening intrusion is great when one fears that such intrusion will
result in loss of power and loss of research subjects.
An example is resistance to changes in how assessment of capacity
is conducted. The suggestion that assessment of capacity be con-
ducted by a person or persons independent of the research team92
produces struggles over who is in control of the process and why each
person's view should prevail. These power struggles are primarily be-
tween those who have traditionally been responsible for capacity as-
sessment (i.e. physicians [usually psychiatrists]) and those who are
suggesting that the process might be enhanced by independent capac-
ity assessment (i.e. bioethicists, patient advocates, and lawyers).
Suggestions that independent assessment is needed to compen-
sate for lack of objectivity and a weakening of an overriding concern
(1981); SUSAN SHERVIN, No LONGER PATIENT: FEMINIST ETHICS AND HEALTH CARE 43
(1992); ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT 6 (1988).
90. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
MORAL DEVELOPMENT 105 (1982) (Based on three similar studies, the author throughout
reflects a central assumption within her research: that the way people talk about their lives
is of significance, that the language they use and the connections they make reveal the
world that they see and in which they act.).
91. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Rethinking the Conduct of.Psychiat~ic Research, 54 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 117, 199 (1997).
92. See DeRenzo, supra note 4, at 21-22.
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for the welfare of the person threatens the physician-investigator qua
physician. The same suggestion threatens the physician-investigator
qua investigator by implying that more subjects will be assessed not-
capacitated and thereby rendered ineligible for study enrollment.
Although these are legitimate concerns, they must be openly dis-
cussed and systematically studied. That introduction into the consent
process of disinterested third parties will result in loss of power or
research subjects is a factual belief, not a fact. We simply have no data
about these issues. But while we await such useful data to be gener-
ated, keeping these concerns hidden and invisible assures that crea-
tive or constructive thinking about these matters will be constrained.
The final and forceful argument that has served as a successful
barrier to development and implementation of additional protections
for decisionally-impaired persons in research is that additional rules
and protective mechanisms will inappropriately slow down the pro-
gress of science. Here, too, this argument can no longer be unques-
tioningly defended. Although no systematic study has been
conducted to gather data to support or refute this position, there is
documented experience with at least one protocol indicating that the
supposition was not sustainable in that case.
A research study investigating brain glucose metabolism in
Alzheimer's Disease, presently being conducted at the National Insti-
tutes of Aging (NIA), includes in its study population subjects in the
advanced stages of Alzheimer's Disease and Down Syndrome who
have severe decisional impairments.9" When initially presented to the
NIA's Institutional Review Board (IRB), the protocol was written to
allow persons to be eligible for enrollment by a surrogate if that surro-
gate was appointed through the documentation of an ethically and
legally valid Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care (DPA), as per-
mitted by existing National Institutes of Health policy.
All on the IRB agreed that the protocol should be designated no-
expected-direct benefit, greater-than-minimal-risk. All agreed, also,
that the study was of significant import, was well designed, and could
not be conducted without severely decisionally-impaired subjects.
The IRB, however, did not agree that just any DPA was adequate. In-
stead, the IRB required that unless the existing DPA specifically docu-
mented willingness to participate in research, the DPA was not
sufficient to allow for surrogate enrollment.
93. DeRenzo was a member of the NIA's IRB when this protocol was presented, passed,
and reviewed on continuing review for the first 3 years of the protocol's performance.
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At that time, the opposing argument was grounded in the conse-
quentialist proposition that such a restriction on subject enrollment
would so constrain subject accrual as to inappropriately slow down the
study. That hypothesis has been refuted. As the protocol has been re-
reviewed annually by the IRB, the investigators have reported that the
restriction has not slowed or had any other deleterious effect on sub-
ject accrual or other aspects of study progress.
This information, along with the reinterpretation of the ethical
arguments that have to date impeded progress in developing novel
protections for decisionally impaired persons in research, juxtaposed
against the advent of radical court decisions94 and, these authors
hope, sound and useful state legislation, suggests that the time has
come to break down barriers to collaborative discussion. For it is only
through thoughtful, open, and collaborative discussion that there is
hope of real improvement in how the ethical sensitivities presented by
biomedical and social science research involving decisionally-impaired
persons can take hold.
Empirical Research Presently Underway
While the debates continue in public, professional, legislative,
and judicial fora, empirical studies are slowly progressing. The au-
thors, with the addition of other colleagues, have recently completed
the first series of studies investigating a novel consent education de-
sign and a standardized clinical assessment tool. The first study,9 5 ex-
amined whether or not the Evaluation to Sign Consent (ESC) form
could be used to discriminate between those persons who were and
were not sufficiently capacitated to provide ethically and legally valid
consent.
96
The ESC is a tool for assessing a subject's factual understanding
of information required to provide ethically valid consent to partici-
pate in a specific research study.97 In the aforementioned study, after
a variable period of education about the research study to which the
psychiatric patient was going to be asked to consent to join,98 but
94. See T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted by 684
N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997), and appeal dismissed by 1997 WL 785461 (N.Y. Dec. 22, 1997).
95. See Robert R. Conley et a!., Evaluating Ability to Consent to Schizophrenia Re-
search (unpublished data, on file with authors, Robert Conley & Evan DeRenzo).
96. The ESC was developed by Raymond Love, Pharm.D., University of Maryland,
School of Pharmacy in 1988 for the purpose of evaluating the ability of people to consent
in practical clinical situations.
97. See Conley et al., supra note 95, at 3.
98. See id. at 10.
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before the formal consent process was initiated, the ESC was adminis-
tered to the prospective subject by a psychiatrist or research nurse in-
dependent of the research team.99 If the prospective subject scored
all five questions correctly, the prospective subject would then be eligi-
ble to enter into the formal consent process, conducted by the Princi-
ple Investigator (Conley), of the primary research study, a
randomized, double-blind drug trial."' 0
The ESC's first systematic use was in 1990 in a study of twenty-
four subjects in a randomized, double-blind drug trial.' t In that early
experience with the ESC, the -majority of subjects (16/24) failed the
assessment. 10 2 To increase ability to provide ethically and legally valid
consent, the consent education groups were initiated.10 3 The sixteen
subjects who did not pass the ESC initially entered the group.10 4 Sub-
jects were tested every two weeks with the ESC.1" 5 Four subjects
passed at week 2, eight at week 4, one at week 6, two at week 8 and one
at week 16.1"6 Subjects were not re-tested in this study after they
passed the ESC.' ° 7
A new study for which data are now being analyzed by the authors
asks the questions: Do psychiatric research subjects retain their capac-
ity to provide consent throughout study participation as measured by
the ESC? If they do, is there a relationship between capacity to con-
sent and participation in a weekly education group?' Preliminary
analysis of the data from this second study indicates that subjects, in
the main, do retain their ability to provide ethically and legally valid
consent as assessed by the ESC."°9 In this study, as in the study just
analyzed," 0 the majority of subjects passed the ESC assessment
evaluation.
At the same time these studies have been proceeding, Paul Appel-
baum and.his research group .have collaborated with Conley and his
colleagues at the University of Maryland Medical School, as well as
researchers at the University of Virginia and the University of Pitts-
99. See id. at 11.
100. See id. at 10.
101. See Conley et. al., supra note 95 (unpublished data, on file with co-author, Robert R.
Conley).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Unpublished data, on file with authors.
109. See id.
110. See Conley et al., supra note 95.
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burgh, to evaluate the usefulness of the standardized assessment tool
used for evaluating capacity to give research consent that Appelbaum
and his colleagues have developed. This tool is the MacArthur Com-
petence Assessment Tool - Clinical Research (MacCAT-CR). In his
presentation to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC)
on July 15, 1997, Appelbaum presented preliminary findings from the
three sites where the MacCAT-CR is being tested."' He reported to
the NBAC that the majority of subjects at the University of Maryland
and at the University of Virginia failed the assessment but the majority
of subjects at the University of Pittsburgh passed."t 2
Both instruments appear to have some utility. Both, however, are
only initial attempts at what will require steady and refined study if a
truly valid and reliable assessment-of-capacity-to-give-consent-to-re-
search tool is to be successfully developed and widely used. We see
these two assessment tools as book ends to a process that promises to
eventually produce a solid assessment instrument. Such an instru-
ment is badly needed.
There is a general consensus that ethically and legally valid con-
sent requires at least an ability to express a choice, understanding of
the relevant information, voluntariness, and appreciation of the situa-
tion and its possible consequences. 113 How one operationalizes these
requirements, however, has yet to be determined. To date, assess-
ment has been made on clinical indicators, and we already have evi-
dence that clinical judgment is not enough. For some time, data have
been available demonstrating that when clinical judgment alone is
compared to evaluation, including standardized instruments and
scales, a wide range of mental and physical problems and diagnoses
are missed with clinical judgment alone." 4
To the best of the authors' knowledge, the ESC and the MacCAT-
CR are the only two assessment-of-capacity-to-give-consent-to-research
tools in the testing phase. Both show promise. Both, however, also
have their shortcomings.
The ESC is a five-item questionnaire designed to evaluate a pro-
spective or on-going subject's factual comprehension of information
relevant to participation in the actual study for which the subject is
being considered or in which the subject is already participating. The
111. See NBAC testimony of Paul S. Appelbaum, supra note 8, at 4.
112. See id.
113. See generally 45 CFR § 46; NBAC testimony of Paul S. Appelbaum, supra note 8, at
119.
114. See Ellen M. Pinholt et al., Functional Assessment for the Elderly: A Comparison of Stan-
dard Instrunments with Clinical Judgment, 147 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED., 484, 486 (1987).
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MacCAT-CR is a twenty page questionnaire that poses questions about
a hypothetical study. The ESC is short and concrete, asking only
about study-specific facts. The MacCAT-CR is much longer and ab-
stract, asking questions about which there is philosophic disagree-
ment in the research and research ethics communities. "' The ESC
may not be sufficiently rigorous. The MacCAT-CR may be setting a
standard higher for persons with psychiatric disease than for physi-
cian-investigators and bioethicists. When all the testing is over, it is
highly likely that the ESC will be deemed too easy to pass and the
MacCAT-CR deemed too difficult.
There is also another instrument that has the potential for appli-
cation to the research setting given appropriate modifications. The
AID to Capacity Evaluation (ACE)," 6 although created for clinical
practice, appears to be amenable to adaptation to the research set-
ting." 7 The ACE, developed at the Joint Center for Bioethics at the
University of Toronto, is approximately the length of the ESC. It is
short and concrete and asks questions about the patient's actual situa-
tion, but with a more complex scoring and evaluation system than
either the ESC or the MacCAT-CR. This instrument, like the ESC and
the MacCAT-CR, has strengths and weakness and offers insights into
the assessment testing process that may be usefully incorporated into
an instrument that ultimately meets the challenge. In the meantime,
the time-consuming process of clinical research designed to yield such
an instrument continues.
Conclusion: Charting a Course for Future Research and Debate
Many more studies and open discussions will be required if we
are to better understand how to assess an individual's capacity to pro-
vide ethically and legally valid consent. As such research and discus-
sions progress towards development of a standardized assessment
instrument, we must be careful not to make changes in the research
process prematurely. Although it is clear that we need better under-
standing of what capacities are required for an individual to be able to
provide fully informed consent, and we need better and more open
115. For example, subjects are asked to make distinctions between direct-benefit and
no-direct benefit research that are points of controversy in the research ethics community.
116. See Edward Etchells et al., Accuracy of Clinical Assessments of Patient Capacity to Consent
to Treatment, 114J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 114, 114 (1996); Edward Etchells et al., Bioethicsfor
Clinicians: 3. Capacity, 155 CANADLAN MED. J. 657, 659 (1996).
117. Electronic mail and letters from Ed Etchells, MD, MSC, Asst. Prof. Dept. of Med.,
University of Toronto (September, 1997).
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ways of assessing those capacities, we ought not rush ahead without
first having sound information upon which to base any changes.
In urging prudence in how we make changes, we return to the
discrimination argument, considering it in its broadest sense. We
agree that protections related to research participation with decision-
ally-impaired persons will, and should, focus heavily on persons with
psychiatric diseases. We argue this point on the clinical grounds that
many psychiatrically ill persons will have impaired decisional capaci-
ties, as we discussed earlier in this article in greater detail. Thus, we
interpret the principle of justice, in the case of decisionally-impaired
persons, to require that persons be provided that which they need and
deserve. That is, we accept that persons with decisional impairments
may require different and greater protections than those who do not
have such impairments, a point made clearly in the Belmont Report's
explanation of how we treat persons with respect."" By treating per-
sons in different ways fair treatment of all can better be assured.
But rushing is likely to produce harmful unintended conse-
quences rather than merely improved process. Without careful study
and incremental implementation of well-designed change, seemingly
useful changes may, in fact, result in adding greater burdens to an
already burdened group - a grave injustice indeed. An example fa-
miliar to all will demonstrate the possibilities.
Deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill was heralded as a pan-
acea. But there were no sound data at the time the Mental Retarda-
tion Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Act"' was
passed in 1963.20 Instead, sweeping changes in the traditional meth-
ods of providing clinical care to psychiatrically ill persons were insti-
tuted as a result of political momentum, albeit based on legitimate
concerns. But regardless of how well-placed those concerns were, suf-
ficient data about how to go about making such sweeping changes in a
way that helped, and did not harm those affected were lacking. To-
day, the plight of many homeless persons is a palpable reminder of
the miseries that come of change brought about too swiftly, regardless
of the underlying good will that motivates it.
Therefore, instead of risking making new errors in how we treat
persons made vulnerable by disease and conditions that impair their
ability to make their own decisions, let us conduct the research, pains-
118. THE NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS-OF BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 69, at 4.
119. Pub. L. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (1963).
120. See Richard Jed Wyatt & Evan G. DeRenzo, Scienceess to Homeless, 234 SCIENCE 1309
(1986).
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taking, expensive and time-consuming as it may be, in an effort to
develop the knowledge and standardized tools needed to more ade-
quately measure ability to provide consent to research participation.
Simultaneously, the research, research ethics and advocacy communi-
ties must hold the kind of open and thoughtful conversations that are
required to allow us all. to use knowledge, gained wisely, in advancing
the well being of decisionally-impaired persons. For while it may be
true that such persons are in need of novel mechanisms for assuring
that ethically and legally valid consent can be obtained for their re-
search participation, it is certainly true that such persons need the
research into the treatments and cures of their diseases to go forward.
